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We analyse the eﬀects of money growth within a standard New Keyne-
sian framework and show that the interaction between staggered nominal
contracts and money growth leads to a long-run trade-oﬀ between output
and money growth. We explore the microeconomic mechanisms that lead
to this trade-oﬀ, and show that it remains even when the contract length
is endogenised.
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Macroeconomic modelling has converged over the past decade onto what is often referred to
as a “new neo-classical synthesis”: a type of model derived from the microeconomic
behaviour of firms and households, but with temporary price and wage rigidities which lead
to a role for monetary policy. Such models are widely used to analyse the full range of
macroeconomic questions.  However such models generally assume an inflation rate of zero.
Since inflation rates are usually positive, it is important to explore the consequences of
relaxing this assumption. In this paper we ask whether such models can generate a long-run
tradeoff between inflation and unemployment.
The real effects of inflation in our model occur as a result of the existence of staggered wage
contracts – different cohorts of workers renegotiate their wage contracts at different times,
and when they do so hold the (nominal) wage fixed for a set period of time (in our baseline
calibration we assume wage contracts last for one year).
Since workers hold their nominal wage fixed while the price level is rising, firms will want
less of their labour at the start of the wage contract (when the wage is relatively high
compared to the price level), and more at the end of the wage contract (when the wage is
relatively low compared to the price level).  This results in what we call employment cycling:
and the higher is inflation, the greater is the difference between the real wage at the start of
the contract and that at the end, so the greater is the degree of employment cycling.  This
cycling is inefficient for firms so as inflation increases firms hire less labour as inflation rises.
Further, if workers prefer smooth labour supply they will dislike employment cycling so will
supply less labour as inflation rises.  Both these effects lead to employment and output falling
as inflation rises.
A third effect is the consequence of households having a positive rate of time preference.
When setting their wage, households do so as a markup over an average of current prices and
expected future prices, putting more weight on current prices because of discounting.  As
inflation increases, the gap between current and future prices increases, and the wage the
household chooses becomes closer to the current than the future wage, so the real wage falls.
This results in employment and output rising as inflation rises.
We show that except at low rates of inflation (and particular calibrations of our model) the
first two effects dominate the third, so higher inflation causes a fall in employment and
output. At low rates of inflation, the third effect is stronger, and results in higher inflation
increasing employment and output.
We go on to allow the length of the contract to be chosen optimally by households and find
that this extra choice does not change our results significantly, at least over the sort of
inflation rates observed in the OECD over the past 50 years.
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Although dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) models with nominal rigidities have become
standard in the macroeconomic literature,1 these models usually neglect money growth, as
their dynamics are derived from linearizations around a steady state in which the money
supply is constant. In practice, of course, the money supply in market economies is
usually growing. Thus it is important to inquire whether the presence of money growth
would change the properties of these models.
The central long-run issue is whether the classical dichotomy holds in the long run, i.e.
whether real variables (such as output, employment or unemployment) are independent of
the inﬂation rate in the long run. Most textbook models of the Phillips curve2 presuppose
this property, thereby making the Phillips curve consistent with a NAIRU or natural
rate of unemployment. By contrast, the standard DGE models with nominal rigidities,
commonly based on Calvo pricing, lead to a New Keynesian Phillips curve of the form
πt = βEtπt+1 +γyt +εt, where π is inﬂation, y is output, β is the discount factor, εt is an
error term, and Et is the expectations operator. Although the long run inﬂation-output
tradeoﬀ implied by this Phillips curve is not vertical, the mainstream view is that it is
negligibly close to vertical, since the discount factor is close to unity in practice.
This paper indicates that the tradeoﬀ between inﬂation and real variables could be
signiﬁcant, depending on the calibration of the underlying DGE model. This issue is
of central importance to macroeconomics. There is a broad consensus in the current
macroeconomic literature that real phenomena can be analyzed independently of nominal
phenomena in the long run; and this helps explain the appeal of the New Neo-Classical
Synthesis and the NAIRU hypothesis. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether
this consensus rests on tenuous foundations.
As far as we are aware, the only studies which examine the inﬂuence of steady-state
money growth in a DGE framework are Ascari (1998, 2000) and Devereux and Yetman
(2002). Whereas they ﬁnd that steady-state output and employment are indeed aﬀected
by money growth, they do not examine the microeconomic mechanisms leading to this
result. This paper identiﬁes the various channels whereby money growth aﬀects the real
economy in the long run, and explores the inﬂuence of each. This provides an intuitive
1Recent surveys include Goodfriend and King (1997), Roberts (1997), Estrella and Fuhrer (1998),
Mankiw (2000), and Gali (2002).
2See, for example, Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and Romer (1996).
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inﬂation.
In particular, we analyze a DGE model with staggered wage contracts (of the Taylor
(1980a) type). An analogous analysis, with the similar qualitative conclusions, can be
derived for Taylor price contracts and for Calvo wage and price contracts (see Graham
and Snower (2003)). Our results may be summarized as follows.
• First, we show that, for a given length of nominal wage contracts, real variables
are not independent of inﬂation. This is so even though we make the standard
assumptions that agents have rational expectations, there is no money illusion, and
there are no permanent nominal rigidities.
• Second, the long-run relation between real variables and inﬂation does not disappear
when the contract frequency is endogenous.
• Third, we show that, in the context of a standard DGE model with nominal rigidities,
the relation between real variables and inﬂation depends on three basic phenomena:
(i) “employment cycling:” ﬁrms’ ability to substitute among diﬀerent labor types
over the contract period, (ii) “labor supply smoothing:” households’ preference for
stable employment paths (rather than ones that are intertemporally volatile), and
(iii) time discounting: households have a positive rate of time preference. Time
discounting generates a positive relation between output and inﬂation, whereas em-
ployment cycling and labor supply smoothing give rise to a negative relation.
• Fourth, we show that, for standard calibrations of the model’s parameters, the time
discounting eﬀe c ti sd o m i n a n ta tl o wi n ﬂation rates, but the employment cycling and
labor supply smoothing eﬀects come to dominate at higher inﬂation rates. Thus the
employment-inﬂation relation is upward-sloping at low inﬂation rates and downward-
sloping at high inﬂation rates. The same is true of the output-inﬂation tradeoﬀ.
The intuition underlying our results is reasonably straightforward. In our model,
households are diﬀerentiated by labor types, which are imperfect substitutes in ﬁrms’
production functions, i.e. there are diminishing returns to each labor type. Thus each
household faces a downward-sloping demand curve for its labor type. The households are
divided into wage-setting cohorts. Diﬀerent cohorts set their nominal wage at diﬀerent
7
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wage is set so as to maximize the household’s utility over the contract period, given its
l a b o rd e m a n dc u r v e .
When the money supply grows, the aggregate price level rises through time. Since
the nominal wage of each cohort is ﬁxed, its real wage is relatively high at the beginning
of the contract period (when the price level is relatively low) and relatively low at the
end of that period (when the price level is relatively high). Since there are diminishing
returns to each labor type, each ﬁrm has an incentive to demand relatively little of the
household’s labor at the beginning of the contract period, and relatively much at the end.
Moreover, since the contract periods are staggered, cohorts with relatively high real wages
(whose contracts have been set recently) are matched by cohorts with relatively low real
wages (whose contracts have been set some time ago) i.e. there is real wage dispersion.
Thus each ﬁrm keeps substituting among diﬀerent labor types, in response to the swings
in relative real wages. This is the employment cycling phenomenon.
In practice, employment cycling is of course much more likely to occur in form of
hours variations than through hiring and ﬁring. There is evidence that overtime work is
sensitive to the wage, and thus it seems plausible that a limited degree of employment
cycling may occur when a signiﬁcant degree of inﬂation occurs over the contract period, so
that signiﬁcant variations in the real wage take place over this period. It is a well-known
empirical regularity that, as the aggregate inﬂation rate rises, relative prices become more
volatile, and this phenomenon is often taken to be the origin of a major real cost of
inﬂation. The ineﬃciency of employment cycling could possibly be viewed as a simple
analytical characterization of this cost.
The faster the money supply grows, the greater is the steady state inﬂation rate (since
in the long run the two are equal we use the terms interchangeably). Thus the greater
are the ﬂuctuations of a cohort’s real wage over a given contract period, and the more
employment cycling the ﬁrms will do. Since the diﬀerent labor types are imperfect sub-
stitutes, more employment cycling means lower average productivity of labor (i.e. a lower
ratio of output to the total number of workers employed by the ﬁrm). On this account,
higher inﬂation is associated with lower output and employment.
Next, observe that ﬁrms’ employment cycling implies that households’ supply of labor
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employment cycling makes the household worse oﬀ. To compensate the household for this
welfare loss, it requires a higher wage. The faster the money supply grows (and thus the
higher the inﬂation rate and greater the degree of employment cycling), the higher is the
real wage that the household sets, for a given average supply of labor over the contract
period. The higher the real wage, the lower is the ﬁrm’s demand for the household’s labor.
Thus, once again, higher inﬂation is associated with lower employment, and thus lower
output as well.
Finally, under staggered wage setting, the current contract wage depends on the current
price level (which prevails at the beginning of the contract period) and the expected future
price level (which prevails later in the contract period). If the households’ rate of time
preference is positive, then the contract wage is inﬂuenced more strongly by the current
price level than the expected future price level. Thus, the faster the money supply grows,
the more the contract wage lags behind the price level; consequently, the lower is the
average real wage over the contract period. The lower the real wage, the more labor will
ﬁrms demand. In this way, discounting generates a positive relation between inﬂation and
employment (and the corresponding output).
The overall degree to which real variables depend on inﬂation clearly depends on the
relative strengths of the employment cycling and labor supply smoothing eﬀects (on the
one hand) and the discounting eﬀect (on the other). At low rates of inﬂation, there is little
employment cycling and thus the supply of labor services is reasonably stable through time.
Consequently the discounting eﬀect is dominant, so that output is positively related to
inﬂation in the long run. But at higher inﬂation rates, employment cycling becomes more
pronounced and thus the supply of labor services becomes more volatile over the contract
period. When these eﬀects become dominant, output becomes negatively related to
inﬂation in the long run.
These results hinge crucially on employment cycling because, as noted, when this
phenomenon is absent, it can be shown that there is no long-run relation between real
variables and inﬂation.
Underlying our analysis is the assumption that households do not index their wages to
steady state money growth. Were there to be indexation, the superneutrality of money
would be restored since there would be none of the wage dispersion on which the three
9
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becomes widespread at high rates of inﬂation.3 A further important assumption is our
choice of Taylor contracts to model the nominal rigidity. Were we to choose Fisher
contracts (pre-set wages that are allowed to vary over the contract period), there would be
no wage dispersion and hence money would be superneutral. Although Fisher contracts
(with cost-of-living adjustments during the contract period) are not uncommon in practice,
this clearly does not imply that Taylor contracts are irrelevant in these cases. A world
without Taylor contracts - or other rigidities that keep wages ﬁxed over ﬁnite time periods
- would be one in which wages could be adjusted instantaneously and continuously through
time, and this is obviously counterfactual except under hyper-inﬂation.
Another possibility, and one widely used in the literature, is to use Calvo contracts.
However in the context of a model with money growth, Calvo contracts are not appropriate.
The reason is straightforward. With Calvo contracts, some households keep their nominal
wage unchanged for a very long period of time, which means the real value of this wage
approaches zero. This implies that the ﬁrm will wish to hire as much of the labor of
these households as possible, and as little of the other households. This extreme form
of employment cycling is very ineﬃcient so output approaches zero. Since we live in a
w o r l di nw h i c hm o n e yg r o w t ha n di n ﬂation are signiﬁcantly positive, this diﬃculty points
to a major limitation of Calvo contracts as a useful approximation to Taylor contracts - a
limitation that has thus far been ignored in the mainstream literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our underlying
DGE model with staggered wage setting under an exogenously given contract period.
Section 3 derives results and discusses in detail the intuition behind them. In section
4 we allow the wage contract period to be determined endogenously, and show that a
long-term relationship between real and nominal variables continues to exist. Section 5
concludes.
3For example, Cecchetti (1984) found that nominal wages in the union sector in the U.S. remained
unchanged for 7 quarters on average, and that the degree of indexing rose with the inﬂation rate. Taylor
(1993) indicates that annual contracts are the most common span over which nominal wages are set. For
a review of the evidence, see Taylor (1999).
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The model consists of three types of agent. First, there is a continuum of households
supplying diﬀerentiated labor. Second, a large number of identical ﬁrms produce a ho-
mogeneous output by means of labor, as described by a production function in which the
households’ labor types are imperfect substitutes. Third, a government prints money and
nominal bonds, and rebates the seigniorage proceeds to households as a lump sum.
Each household makes its wage and employment decisions in a decentralized way, facing
a downward-sloping labor demand curve for its services. The households are grouped into
N wage-setting cohorts, and each cohort sets a nominal wage contract for N periods.
Wage setting is staggered, with diﬀerent cohorts setting wages at diﬀerent periods, spread
uniformly through time.
2.1 Firms
Firms produce a homogeneous output and there is perfect competition in the product
market. Each ﬁrm uses all labor types in a CES production function:4














where yt is output, nt(h) is the amount of labor chosen from household h and θn is the
elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent labor types. This production function is linear
in composite labor nt.S i n c ea l lﬁrms are identical, we normalize the number of ﬁrms to
o n e( t h er e p r e s e n t a t i v eﬁrm).
The representative ﬁrm’s cost-minimization leads to a downward-sloping demand curve
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Suppose that at time t household h resets its nominal wage, which is then constant for N
periods until it can be reset again. Let ct be its consumption of goods, Wt its nominal
wage, Mt its nominal money holding, Pt the aggregate price index, Rt the gross real interest
rate on its bond holdings Bt,a n dTt its net lump-sum transfers from government.
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We choose a utility function that has desirable long-run properties:
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November 2004The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to consumption is:
βi
ct+i (h)
= ρt,t+i λt(h) (9)
For the remainder of the paper, we consider various steady states of this economy and
do not analyze transitions between them. A steady state has the property that each N
period sub-problem of the household’s inﬁnite-horizon optimization is identical, and that
each household faces an identical problem when it comes to reset its wage.
The ﬁrst-order condition for the next N period problem is:
βi+n
ct+i+N (h)
= ρt,t+N+i λt+N (h) (10)
Since households face identical N period sub-problems ct+i+N (h)=ct+i (h) and λt(h)=
λt+N (h). So (9) and (10) imply that ρt,t+i = βi, i.e. the steady-state interest rate is
constant and tied to the discount factor. Further, (9) then states that (in the steady-
state) the household chooses a smooth path of consumption within the contract period5.
































where ¯ ct is the constant level of consumption chosen in the contract period starting at
time t,a n dW∗
t (h) is the optimum wage. The right-hand side is the present value of the
real net payments from government to household consisting of transfers, seigniorage and
revenue from issuing bonds. Since all households behave in the same way, and assuming
that there is no government spending, the value of these net transfers must be zero in the
5To model oﬀ-steady state behaviour in a tractable way, further assumptions would need to be made
such as the existence of perfect insurance markets which household use to insure themselves against shocks
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Substituting for consumption from (12) and assuming a symmetric equilibrium in which












Intuitively, the optimal contract wage sets the present value of the marginal disutility
of labour (the left side of this equation) equal to the corresponding present value of the
marginal utility of consumption (the right side of the equation). Since households smooth
consumption but not employment, the present value of the marginal disutility of labour
depends on time discounting, but the present value of the marginal utility of consumption
does not. In fact, the latter present value is constant. Thus, the optimal contract wage is
set so that the present value of the marginal disutility of labour over the contract period
remains constant through time.
2.3 The steady state
Since we are concerned with the long run relation between real variables and inﬂation,





so that diﬀerent steady-state values of money growth identify diﬀerent points on the real
variable-inﬂation tradeoﬀ.
steady state. If this were not the case, the government’s accumulation of assets or debt
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nominal variables with respect to the money supply. (This detrending process is familiar
from the real business cycle literature (King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988)), although of
course the trend being removed there is one of technology growth.) For example, the










where µ is steady state money growth, Wt+i is the detrended wage, and Wt+i is its trended
counterpart.
























Observe that steady-state money growth uniquely determines the ratio of the contract
wage to the aggregate wage (given the parameters of the model).
The household’s labor supply function (14) determines steady-state household labor
supply. Given this labor supply and the wage ratio (17), we obtain aggregate steady-state
output y from the labor demand function (6). In short, (6), (14) and (17) comprise a
system of three equations in the three unknowns (n(h),W∗
W ,y) which deﬁne the steady
state of the system. We solve this system numerically.6
3R e s u l t s
We calibrate our model with standard values: the annual real interest rate is 4%; the
elasticity of labor substitution is θn =5 ; the contract period is one year. There are 52
wage-setting cohorts,7 so that each week one cohort sets its nominal wage and then keeps
it ﬁxed for a year. Furthermore, we let households’ preferences over leisure be linear,
6Details of the solution method are available from the authors on request
7The results are quite insensitive to the number of cohorts.
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November 2004η =0meaning that households are indiﬀerent to the path of labor supplied . Although
there is little doubt that the marginal disutility of labor rises with the amount of labor
provided per working day, it seems doubtful that most people have strong preferences in
favor of labor smoothing over their wage contract period. On the contrary, many people
prefer to bunch their overtime work, in order to make room for free time (shopping days,
holidays). The intertemporal substitution of labor relevant to our analysis is that which
occurs over the contract period, and in this context there may be little preference for labor
smoothing8.In any case, our results under positive values of η are given in the next section.
Figure 1 shows aggregate steady-state employment and output (on the vertical axis)
for diﬀerent values of steady-state money growth (on the horizontal axis). Observe that
employment increases monotonically with money growth. Thus if we deﬁne unemploy-
ment as the diﬀerence between total available labor time and employment, we obtain a
downward-sloping Phillips curve in inﬂation-unemployment space. Note, however, that
output is positively related to steady-state inﬂation (money growth) at low inﬂation rates,
but negatively related at higher inﬂation rates. In other words, the output-inﬂation trade-
oﬀ is backward-bending.
3.1 Intuition
To gain an intuitive understanding of these relations, consider the simple case in which
there are just two wage-setting cohorts (N =2 ) and each nominal wage is set for two
periods. Let cohort 0 set its wage at time t while cohort 1 sets its wage at time t +1 .
Suppose that steady-state money growth - and thus steady-state inﬂation - is positive.
Since the price level rises from period to period whereas each cohort’s nominal wage is
readjusted every second period, it follows that each cohort’s real wage is high at the
beginning of its contract period and low at the end of it. Speciﬁcally, at time t,t h er e a l
wage of cohort 0 is high and that of cohort 1 is low, and vice versa at time t +1 .
The ﬁrm at time t has a relatively low demand for cohort 0 and relatively high demand
for cohort 1, and vice versa at time t +1 . This substitution towards labor types with low
r e a lw a g e s( a n da w a yf r o ml a b o rt y p e sw i t hh i g hr e a lw a g e s )i st h ee s s e n c eo fw h a tw e
have called employment cycling.
8In the real business cycle literature, η =0in the indivisible labor case. This is straightforwardly
reconcilable with our argument that employment cycling takes place primarily in terms of hours variations.
After all, a one-year wage contract period is suﬃciently long to permit workers to bunch their labor services
over the contract period even though these services may come in discrete units.
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ﬁcient in the sense that, for given aggregate employment n, more employment cycling is
associated with lower aggregate output. The greater is steady-state inﬂation rate, the
more employment cycling ﬁrms do, and thus the lower the average productivity of labor.
In this way, the employment cycling eﬀect leads to a negative relation between output and
inﬂation.
To see this formally, note that since aggregate output y is linear in aggregate employ-
ment n, the aggregate wage W is equal to the aggregate price level P. Thus, by the wage




















For a given employment level nt (0), we can see that the higher the rate of money growth
µ (and thus the higher the inﬂation rate), the lower will be the corresponding level of
aggregate output yt. This is the employment cycling eﬀect.
The other determinant of the relation between real variables and inﬂation curve is the
time discounting eﬀect.9 By (13), observe that, for a two-period contract, the optimal
contract wage W∗
t (h) is a weighted average of the current price level Pt and the future
price level Pt+1. The lower the discount factor β (i.e. the higher the discount rate), the
smaller the weight on the future price relative to the present one. Thus, the faster the
money supply grows, the more the contract wage lags behind the average price level over
the contract period, i.e. the lower the average real contract wage over the contract period.
As a result, the ﬁrm employs more labor and produces more output over the contract
period, ceteris paribus.
Another view of discounting eﬀect emerges from the labor supply function (14). Recall
that this implies that the household sets its contract wage so that the present value of
the marginal disutility of labor is a constant. Thus, the lower the discount factor β,t h e
more labor it supplies over the contract period. Formally, note that whereas cohort A’s
9Note that since households’ preferences over leisure are linear, there is no labor supply smoothing eﬀect
17
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Substituting the employment equations (19) and (21) into the labor supply function (14)






Thus aggregate employment is





For positive real interest rates (β<1) this expression is increasing in µ so steady state
employment increases with money growth.
Putting the employment cycling and discounting eﬀects together, we ﬁnd that as money
growth (and steady-state inﬂation) increases, employment rises (due to the discounting
eﬀect) but output for any given level of employment falls (due to employment cycling).
At low inﬂation rates, there is little employment cycling, and thus the discounting eﬀect
dominates. As result, there is a positive long-run relation between output and inﬂation.
However, at higher inﬂation rates, ﬁrms engage in lots of employment cycling, and once
this cycling eﬀect dominates, the long-run relation between output and inﬂation turns
negative.
3.2 Linearizations
Since we are working in the familiar framework of Taylor contracts, it is instructive to
obtain a wage setting equation which we can compared with that in Taylor (1980a). To
do this, consider a simpliﬁed case where there are just two cohorts i.e. N =2 . Substituting
18
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(1 − k1) ˆ W∗




















θn (1 + β)
(1 − k1) (28)
This is a microfounded analogue of Taylor (1980a) wage-setting equation.
Consider ﬁrst the case of µ =1 , i.e. we are linearizing around a steady state money
growth of zero. Then the wage setting equation becomes
ˆ W∗
t = α ˆ W∗
t−1 +( 1− α) ˆ W∗
t+1 − (2α − 1) ˆ µt +
1
θn






In the long-run steady state, ˆ W∗
t = ˆ W∗
t−1 = ˆ W∗
t+1, ˆ µt =ˆ µt+1 =ˆ µ and ˆ yt =ˆ yt+1 =ˆ y so
the equation simpliﬁes to a long-run relation between output and money growth:




and since β<1 output is positively related to money growth. This is the case examined
in Graham and Snower (2002). It isolates the discounting eﬀect, because in the absence
of inﬂation there is no employment cycling.
Now consider the general case in which money growth need not be zero. Then, given
that steady-state inﬂation is equal to money growth (b π = b µ), the long-run relation between
output and inﬂation is
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βµθn





that the output-inﬂation relation is positive at low inﬂation rates, but negative at high
inﬂation rates. For β =0 .98 (corresponding to a real interest rate of 4% per year), the
change-over occurs at a steady-state inﬂation rate of 6%.
3.3 Sensitivities
The key parameters of the model are (a) the discount factor, β = 1
1+r, where r is the real
interest rate, (b) the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of labor, η, (c) the elasticity
of substitution between diﬀerent labor types, θn, and Let us consider the sensitivities of
the relation between real variables and inﬂation to each of these parameters in turn.
3.3.1 The Interest Rate
Figure 2 shows the sensitivity to the real interest rate r for the indivisible labor case.
The greater is r, the stronger is the time discounting eﬀect. Thus, for any positive money
growth rate, the more the contract wage lags behind the average price level over the
contract period, and this leads the ﬁrms to employ more labor and produce more output.
In Figure 2, consequently, increases in the real interest rate move the employment-inﬂation
and output-inﬂation curves upwards.
3.3.2 The Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution
Consider a more general utility function in which the elasticity of utility with respect to
l e i s u r em a yb eg r e a t e rt h a nu n i t y :η>0. In that case, households have a preference for
smoothing their labor through time. Figures 3a and 3b show how steady-state employment
and output vary with money growth for several illustrative values of η. Observe that in-
creases in the elasticity η shift the steady-state employment-inﬂation and output-inﬂation
curves downwards. Even raising η from zero to 0.2 signiﬁcantly reduces the range over
which employment and output rise with money growth and the output-inﬂation relation
turns negative at a lower inﬂation rate.
T h er e a s o ni sw h a tw eh a v ec a l l e dt h elabor-supply smoothing eﬀect.D u et oe m p l o y -
ment cycling, individual households cannot provide a constant stream of labor services
through time. Since the marginal disutility of labor rises with labor, these ﬂuctuations in
hours worked makes them worse oﬀ. In response, they set their contract wage so as to
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via the production function, lower output. In this way, the labor-supply smoothing eﬀect
imparts a negative relation to the steady-state employment-inﬂation tradeoﬀ and, via the
production function, to the output-inﬂation tradeoﬀ.
To see the intuition underlying this result, consider the case of two wage-setting cohorts
(N =2 )a n ds e tβ =1to eliminate the discounting eﬀect. Then the labor supply function
(14) becomes
(1 − nt)
−η nt +( 1− nt+1)
−η nt+1 = k (33)
Note that the present value of the marginal disutility of labor (the right side of this
equation) is convex in labor, so the household prefers to smooth its labor through time.
Equation (33) indicates that the greater the diﬀerence between nt+1 and nt (i.e. the
greater the degree of employment cycling), the lower the average level of employment
over the contract period. Thus, in the absence of the discounting eﬀect, the employment-
inﬂation relation is always negative, on account of the labor-supply smoothing eﬀect.
Furthermore, output falls faster than employment as money growth increases, since
the eﬀect of money growth on output depends not only on the labor-supply smoothing
eﬀect, but also on employment cycling.
There is always a region around zero money growth where discounting eﬀects dominates
leading to an increase in labor and output with money growth, but this region is tiny for
the standard calibrations.
3.3.3 Elasticity of Substitution in Production
Figure 4 shows sensitivity to the elasticity of substitution in production, θn. Increasing
θn has two eﬀects. First, diﬀerent labor types become closer substitutes and thus a given
amount of employment cycling is associated with higher output. In other words, holding
the degree of employment cycling constant (i.e. constant variation of employment over
the contract period), an increase in θn raises output.
Second, an increase in θn induces the ﬁrm to raise employment cycling, since it is now
less costly to substitute among labor types over the contract period. For a given degree
of labor substitutability in production, an increase in employment cycling leads to a fall
ensure that they supply less labor, on average, over the contract period. Greater money
in output, since diﬀerent labor types are imperfect substitutes.
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low rates of inﬂation, the second eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst. Thus in Figure 4 the output-
inﬂation curve is shifted downwards. Moreover, the employment-inﬂation curve shifts
upwards, because the greater is the degree of cycling, the stronger is the time discounting
eﬀect.
The low values of θn (up to 10) correspond to the usual microeconomic parameter-
izations, whereas the high values (over 10) correspond to parameter values backed out
from standard macro estimates of Taylor wage equations (e.g. Taylor (1980b) and Sachs
(1980)).
3.3.4 The Contract Multiplier
Our analysis indicates that the contract multiplier has a negligible inﬂuence on the long-
run response of real variables to money growth. In other words, changing the number
of wage-setting cohorts, while holding the length of the contract period constant, has
little eﬀect on the long-run employment-inﬂation and output-inﬂation relations.10 What
matters for the long-run relation between real and monetary variables, as we will see in the
following section, is the length of the contract period, rather than the degree of staggering.
4 Endogenising the Frequency of Nominal Adjustments
Thus far we have assumed that the frequency of nominal adjustments (the length of
the wage contract period) remains constant regardless of the rate of money growth. In
this regard, our analysis is susceptible to a version of the Lucas critique, since agents
may have an incentive to set wages more frequently as the rate of money growth rises.
We now consider the following question: When the frequency of nominal adjustments is
endogenised, does the long-run tradeoﬀ between inﬂation and real variables disappear, so
that a NAIRU or natural rate (of output, employment, etc.) is restored? Our answer,
perhaps surprisingly, is no.
Intuitively, our analysis generates a tradeoﬀ between real variables and inﬂation on
10In a related area, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1996) show that the contract multiplier has a negli-
gible eﬀect on the persistence of real eﬀects from temporary monetary shocks. Note, of course, that this
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November 2004account of a nominal rigidity (wage staggering). But if an increase in inﬂation leads agents
to adjust wages more frequently, then the nominal rigidity falls as inﬂa t i o nr i s e s . I ft h e
nominal rigidity were to fall suﬃciently wages would become fully ﬂexible and the tradeoﬀ
between real and nominal variables would be eliminated. We will show, however, that this
does not happen unless inﬂation is extremely high. In the absence of hyper-inﬂation, the
real and monetary sides of the economy remain inextricably interdependent.
To model the frequency of nominal adjustments, we now allow households to choose
the length of their wage contract period (N), assuming there is a ﬁxed cost F to changing
wages. In practice, this ﬁxed costs generally involves much more than a negotiation
cost (e.g. the cost of the time spent negotiating, the expected cost of a breakdown in
negotiations, etc.), since wage adjustment are typically accompanied by performance and
salary reviews. Formally, the household’s problem is to choose N so as to maximize its
















subject to the budget constraints (5) and the labor demand functions (6).
Note that in the steady state this becomes an inﬁnite sum of identical N period prob-


















which can be solved numerically.
We calibrate the ﬁxed cost by assuming that at a steady state inﬂa t i o nr a t eo f4 % ,
wages are set for one year. This is roughly in line with the evidence given by Backus
(1984), Benabou and Bismut (1987), Levin (1991), and Taylor (1993, 1998).12
11In this problem, the household splits the future into a series of N-period problems.




















,a n ds oo n ,t ot h ei n ﬁnite future. The household then choose the
size of the partition N so as to maximize the present value of its utility. See Devereux and Yetman (2002)
for an analogous problem.
12Much of this evidence is indirect, in the sense that it is inferred from autocorrelation functions of
aggregate wage data. Direct evidence on the union sector in the US, presented in Taylor (1983) and
Cecchetti (1984), suggest longer average contract periods. However, much more work needs to be done in
exploring the frequency of wage and price change.
When the frequency of nominal adjustments is endogenized, the labor supply decision needs to be
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November 2004Solving the model for an elasticity of labor supply η =0 , we obtain Figure 5a. These
results are striking and may be summarized as follows.
First, that the endogenisation of the contract period has not eliminated the long-run
relation between inﬂation and real variables. The reason is that changing wages is costly, in
real terms. Speciﬁcally, the higher the rate of money growth (and the higher the associated
rate of steady-state inﬂation), the more employment cycling ﬁrms do and the lower the
average employment over the contract period for any given contract wage. The household
can reduce employment cycling and raise average employment over the contract period (for
any given contract wage) by reducing the contract length. This is the household’s beneﬁt
from reducing the contract length N in response to an increase in steady-state inﬂation.
However, reducing N means expending the ﬁxed cost F more frequently. Consequently,
when steady-state inﬂation rises, the contract period does not fall by enough to eliminate
the tradeoﬀ between inﬂation and real variables.
Figure 5b shows the eﬀect of endogenising N for a wider range of inﬂation. At
suﬃciently high rates of inﬂation, the output-inﬂation and employment-inﬂation relations
eventually bend backward so that a further increase in money growth reduces employment.
At money growth rates that are substantially higher, the beneﬁts of wage adjustment
become so large relative to the costs that wages and prices become perfectly ﬂexible, and
there is no longer a trade oﬀ between real variables and inﬂation. However, this outcome
only obtains under extreme hyper-inﬂations.
Second, when the contract period is endogenous, a rise in steady-state inﬂation rate
leads to shorter contracts and, as a result, the employment-inﬂation relation becomes
weaker (closer to the horizontal axis) than when the contract period remains constant.
To explain this result intuitively, we show that shorter contracts dampen the time-
discounting eﬀect, and thus employment is lower at any given level of inﬂation. As we
have seen, the current contract wage depends on the current price level and all the expected
future price levels over the span of the contract. The shorter the contract, the shorter is
the range of expected future price levels on which the current contract wage depends. If
households have a positive rate of time discount, then the less heavily will future price
recalibrated for each frequency. Speciﬁcally, as inﬂation rises, the frequency of wage adjustments rises and
thus the contract length falls. The households wage setting decision (14) sets the present value of the
marginal disutility of labor equal to the associated present value of the marginal utility of consumption.
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November 2004levels be discounted. Thus, for any given rate of money growth (steady-state inﬂation)
the current contract wage will lag less far behind the price level and, by implication, the
higher is the average real wage over the contract period and thus the lower is employment.
To see why this is so, consider two adjacent wage-setting cohorts, i.e. two cohorts
who set their wages in immediate succession: for example, one in time period t − 1 and
the other in period t − 2, and let the wage contract be more than two periods long. The
ratio of period-t employment across these cohorts depends on the diﬀerence in their real
wages. In steady state, the real wage of cohort A in period t − 2 is the same as the real
wage of cohort B in period t − 1.U n d e rp o s i t i v ei n ﬂation, the real wage of each cohort
falls through time. Thus, since cohort A set its wage before cohort B, the real wage of A
at time t is lower than the real wage of B at time t.T h eg r e a t e r t h e i n ﬂation rate, the
lower is A’s real wage relative to that of B. The ratio of employment across these cohorts
depends on this divergence in real wages.







yt+i. Thus, in the steady state, n+i =
¡W ∗
W (N)µ−i¢−θw y, where n+i is
steady-state employment i periods after the wage is reset. Now consider two adjacent
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the ratio of employment across adjacent cohorts depends only on the inﬂation rate (which




Thus, the steady-state employment of the various cohorts at a particular time may
be depicted by the sequence (n+1,n +2,...,n+N), which is a rising geometric series. If
a change in the contract period N would lead to a mean-preserving spread on cohort
employment, then aggregate employment would remain unchanged. Speciﬁcally, suppose









to (n+1,n +2,n +3). Then, in a mean-preserving spread, the fall
in the size of the largest cohort (from n0
+5 to n+3) would be equal to the rise in the size
of the smallest cohort (from n+1 to n0
+1).
So, when the contract period N shortens in response to a rise in inﬂation, will house-
holds adjust their wages so as to induce a mean-preserving spread in cohort employment?
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households have less opportunity to discount the future, and thus the wages it receives are
valued more highly. On this account, households set their contract wage higher than the
wage that would yield a mean-preserving spread in cohort employment. From the time
the contract wage is set, their real wage falls over the contract period, raising employment
(with an elasticity greater than unity) and consumption as the contract period progresses.
Due to the curvature of the households’ utility function, the households’ disutility of labor
will rise relative to the utility of consumption. Moreover, since the shortening of the con-
tract periods leads households to discount the future less heavily, households’ attach more
importance to the increase in the disutility of labor relative to the utility of consumption.
Thus, they set their wage higher, and induce lower employment.
In short, the ﬁrm’s employment decisions depend on the real wages of diﬀerent cohorts
at the same point in time, whereas the household’s wage setting decisions depend on
the real wages they receive through time. And since households discount the future, a
shortening of the contract period leads them to adjust their wages so as to sacriﬁce some
present utility for the sake of future utility. Thus aggregate employment falls.















































N´ (θw − 1)
ςθw
(40)
Thus, aggregate employment is increasing in N when there is a discounting eﬀect (i.e.
when β<1).
Third, the output-inﬂation relation is weaker (closer to the horizontal axis) under en-
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increases, and the contract period shortens as result, there are two eﬀects on output: (a)
As noted above, employment falls (for any given level of inﬂation). Thus, for any given
degree of employment cycling, aggregate output falls. (b) As the contract period shortens,
the degree of employment cycling falls. Since diﬀerent types of labor are imperfect substi-
tutes, less employment cycling means more output. As shown in Figure 5, the second eﬀect
dominates.13 Intuitively, it is clear that the second eﬀect must dominate when inﬂation
is suﬃciently high, because eventually gives wage setters have the incentive to set wage
ﬂexibly (N =1 ). Then money superneutrality is reestablished and the output-inﬂation
curve coincides with the horizontal axis.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has investigated how the long-run employment-inﬂation and output-inﬂation
tradeoﬀs depend on microeconomic behavior patterns. In particular, we have shown that
these tradeoﬀs are the outcome of three interrelated inﬂuences: (i) The greater the degree of
time discounting, the more the contract wage depends on current rather than future prices,
and thus the more the contract wage lags behind the price level when there is inﬂation.
(ii) Staggered wage contracts in an inﬂationary environment lead to employment cycling,
i.e. ﬁrms substitute among diﬀerent labor types in responses to their relative real wage
movements. Since diﬀerent labor types are imperfect substitutes, the greater the degree of
employment cycling, the lower will be the level of output (ceteris paribus). (iii) Households
prefer stable employment paths to those that vary over time. Thus greater the degree of
employment cycling, the greater will be the average real wage that workers will require.
The ﬁrst inﬂuence imparts a positive relation to the employment-inﬂation and output-
































Thus, aggregate output rises less fast than aggregate employment with the contract period N.
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November 2004inﬂation tradeoﬀs, whereas the latter two inﬂuences impart a negative relation to these
tradeoﬀs. The relative strength of the three inﬂuences, of course, depends on the relative
magnitudes of the underlying microeconomic parameters: the rate of time discount, the
elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent labor types, and the elasticity of labor supply.
We have shown that when the contract length is endogenised, the long-run levels of
output and employment may be sensitive to changes in money growth (and thus inﬂation)
at low levels of inﬂation, but at higher levels of inﬂation real variables become independent
of inﬂation. This is so even at contract periods of signiﬁcant length, i.e. the relation
between real variables and inﬂation disappears before inﬂation becomes so high that wages
and prices become fully ﬂexible.
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Figure 2 : Sensitivity to the real interest rate
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November 2004Figure 3b : Sensitivity to the elasticity of labour supply (eta)
Figure 4 : Sensitivity to the elasticity of substitution between labour types (theta)
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